The Sources of Happiness: Evidence from the Investment Game by Leonardo Becchetti & Giacomo degli Antoni
The Sources of Happiness: 




Giacomo Degli Antoni 








The Sources of Happiness: Evidence from the Investment Game 
 
Leonardo Becchetti





The present paper draws on data collected in an investment game plus a questionnaire to investigate 
whether happiness is affected by circumstances and/or outcomes of the game and to evaluate which 
motivations  or  preference  structures  (self-interested  preferences,  inequity  aversion,  altruism,  warm 
glow, social-welfare preferences, trust or reciprocity) may explain such effect. Our result shows that 
the amount sent has significant and positive effect on trustors’ self-declared happiness. We interpret 
this finding by arguing that the happiness effect can be explained by the enactment of the “generating” 
(social welfare enhancing) power of the trustor’s decision. Characteristics of the investment game are 
such that the trustor has a value creating while the trustee only a redistributive power. This difference 
may explain why only trustors and not trustees are significantly and positively affected by their giving 
decision. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The  investment  game  has  been  widely  used  by  experimental  economists  to  test  the  central 
economic assumption that agents are motivated by the pursue of their own self-interest.
1 According to 
the design proposed by Berg Dickhaut and McCabe (1995) the investment game is played by two 
subjects (the “trustor” and the “trustee”) who are both endowed with $10. The trustor must decide how 
much  of  her  endowment  to  send  to  the  trustee.  The  experimenter  triples  the  amount  sent  and  the 
resulting sum is delivered to the trustee. The trustee (the second mover) must decide how much of the 
amount received (if positive) to send back to the first mover. 
In  their  1995  experiment,  Berg  et  al.  showed  that  theoretical  assumptions  based  on  self-
regarding preferences fails to predict agents’ behavior: 
a)  only 2 of 32 trustors in the no-history treatment sent zero ($5.16 was the average amount sent); 
b)  11 of 30 trustees who received a positive amount of money returned more than their counterpart 
sent. 
Moreover,  when  results  from  this  experiment  were  provided  to  subjects  involved  in  a  subsequent 
treatment (the “social history” treatment), the average amount sent by trustors increased ($5.36) and the 
correlation between the amount sent and the payback becomes significant. Berg et al. interpreted their 
data by highlighting the role of trust in relation to the trustors and the role of reciprocity with respect to 
the trustees. 
Cox  (2004)  pointed  out  that  the  described  investment  game  design  does  not  allow 
discriminating  “between  actions  motivated  by  trust  or  reciprocity  and  actions  motivated  by  other-
regarding preferences characterized by altruism or inequality aversion that is not conditional on the 
behavior  of  others.”  Cox  (2004,  p.262).  Cox  (2004)  implemented  a  triadic  experimental  design 
involving the investment game and two dictator games which give a first or “second mover” the same 
possible choices as in the original game but remove the possible effects of the (observed or anticipated) 
actions of the other player. This design provides evidence of the role of both altruistic or inequality-
averse other-regarding preferences and trust (with respect to trustors) or reciprocity (with respect to 
trustees).
2 
                                                 
1 See for example Berg Dickhaut and McCabe (1995), Camerer (2003), Dufwenberg, Gneezy, Güth, and van Damme 
(2001), Fershtman and Gneezy (2001), Cox (2004), Ben-Ner and Putterman (2009) among others. 
2 Cox and Deck (2005) used a triadic design, consisting of the trust game and two dictator control games, to investigate the 
role of trust and positive reciprocity in the trust game which is a generally studied truncation of the investment game. They 
found that first movers’ behavior was characterized by significant trust in positive reciprocity, while positive reciprocity of   3 
The novelty of the present paper is in studying with an investment game (Berg et al. 1995) if 
payoffs of players and/or their behavior in the game - referable to self-interested preferences, altruistic 
or inequality-averse (Fehr and Schmidt 1999) other-regarding preferences (Cox 2004), social-welfare 
preferences (Charness and Rabin 2002), warm glow (Andreoni 1989 and 1990) and trust (on the part of 
trustors) or reciprocity (on the part of trustees) - affect their self-declared happiness.  
Happiness is measured through questionnaires randomly filled in by players alternatively: a) 
after the game was ended and payoffs made known or b) before players even know the rules of the 
game so that the happiness declarations can not be affected by the decisions taken in the game. Such 
choice allowed us to tackle the problem of reverse causality, a crucial issue in happiness studies.
3  
Even  though  questionnaires  are  commonly  used  in  experimental  economics  and  happiness 
questions  have  been  increasingly  considered  in  economic  analyses
4  (see  the  surveys  by  Frey  and 
Stutzer,  2002a  and  2002b  and  Clark  et  al.,  2006),  only  a  few  studies  related data  collected  from 
experimental games and happiness declarations. By using simple binary decisions and self-reported 
happiness, Charness and Grosskopf (2001) showed that players who choose to assign the other person 
lower payoffs than their own are subsequently less happy. By studying a two player power-to-take 
game, Bosman and van Winden (2002) find that responders’ self-reported happiness measured after the 
game is negatively related to the take rate. Konow and Earley (2008) found that higher psychological 
wellbeing is associated with both higher overall happiness (mainly measured before the experiment) 
and more generous giving in dictator games.  
Within this field of the literature the originality of the present paper is twofold. To the best of 
our knowledge, it is the first attempt to combine data from investment game and happiness questions. It 
allowed  us  to  stress  the  effect  of  “social-welfare”  preferences,  which  has  not  been  previously 
considered in the investment game literature, on the decision of trustor to contribute in the game. With 
social-welfare  preferences  we  mean  the  preference  for  maximizing  the  total  payoff  of  the  game. 
Second, our design specifically tackles the issue of causality by comparing the answers to the same 
happiness question given by players alternatively before or after the experiment. 
                                                                                                                                                                        
second movers only emerges when double-blind payoff protocol is not implemented. It provides evidence of a significant 
effect of social distance on reciprocating behavior in trust game.  
3 Almost all the relationships between happiness and its determinants may be affected by a problem of reverse causality. 
Are married people happier or are happier people more likely to get married? (Frey and Stutzer 2006). The same doubt 
concerns, for example, the relation between happiness and unemployment (Clark and Oswald 1994) or happiness and health 
(Graham, Eggers and Sukhtankar 2004). 
4  Most  of  this  literature  admits  that  interpersonal  comparisons  of  utility  are  sound  and  interpretable  by  arguing  that 
individuals are able to recognize or predict self declared happiness of others (Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005; Diener et al. 1999) 
and respondents translate verbal labels more or less into the same numerical values (Van Praag, 1991).   4 
The analysis shows that no strategies or outcomes related to trustees are correlated with their 
happiness declarations. By contrast, we show that trustors’ contribution (and, consequently, the total 
payoff  generated  in  the  game  which  positively  depends  on  the  amount  sent  by  the  trustor)  has  a 
significant  and  positive  effect  on  their  self-declared  happiness.  This  effect  arises  only  when 
questionnaires are filled in after the game, while there is no correlation when questionnaires are filled 
in  before  the  game.
5  Data  analysis  on  trustors  shows  that  neither  self-interest (the  amount  sent  is 
negatively  correlated  with  trustors’  payoffs)  nor  inequity  aversion  (Fehr  and  Schmidt  1999)  may 
explain the correlation between the amount sent and the happiness declaration. By comparing data on 
trustors and trustees we also tend to rule out explanations related to altruism
6 or warm glow (Andreoni 
1989 and 1990). On the contrary, we find evidence of the importance of social-welfare preferences (see 
for example Charness and Rabin 2002). Given the structure of the investment game, trustors have a 
value creating power while trustees only redistributive. The amount sent by trustors is tripled by the 
experiment and it is the only way to increase the total game’s payoff. Our empirical analysis shows that 
the act of sending and, consequently, the creation of social value by enlarging the total game payoff, 
affect trustors’ happiness. It seems to highlights a new motivation to act which may explain agents’ 
decisions in the investment game and, more in general, in situations where individuals may act in order 
to generate social value even though it implies a personal risk.  
Section 2 presents our happiness question and discusses it in relation with the existing literature 
on  happiness  measurement.  Section  3  describes  the  experimental  design  and  the  procedure 
implemented  for  our  experiment.  Section  4  illustrates  and  comments  descriptive  and  econometric 







                                                 
5 Our results do not contradict some famous intuitions on the importance of caring for others for personal happiness by 
Adam Smith (“Concern for our own happiness recommends to us the virtue of prudence: concern for that of other people”; 
Smith, 1759: 385 ) and J. S. Mill (“Those only are happy, I thought, who have their minds fixed on some object other than 
their own happiness, on the happiness of others, on the improvement of mankind, even on some art or pursuit, followed not 
as a means, but as itself an ideal end. Aiming thus at something else, they find happiness by the way”; Mill, 1893: 117). 
6 Utility of altruistic persons increases with the well being of other agents i.e., a person is altruistic if the first partial 
derivatives of  ) ,..., ( 1 N x x U  with regard to  N x x ,..., 1  are strictly positive (Fehr and Schmidt 2000).   5 
2. Reliability of Happiness Questions and our Work in the Happiness Literature 
 
The happiness question used in the survey filled in by subjects involved in our investment game 
asks: “Taken all together, would you say that you are: from 1 (completely unhappy) to 10 (completely 
happy)”.
7 
In spite of their extended use, an important issue related to questions on overall happiness, 
along the lines of the one used in our survey, seems not to have been definitively settled. Do they 
correctly  measure  people’s  overall  happiness  and  how  much  are  they  distorted  from  more  recent 
events? To tackle this issue Kahneman and Krueger (2006) make a distinction between experienced 
utility and remembered utility, that is, between “the way people feel about experiences in real-time and 
the way they remember their experiences after they are over” (Kahneman and Krueger 2006, p.5). 
Several experimental results have shown that retrospective evaluations of past experiences are subject 
to  systematic  biases  with  respect  to  real-time  reports  (Kahneman,  Fredrickson,  Schreiber  and 
Redelmeier 1993; Redelmeier and Kahneman 1996). The authors explain their findings by arguing that 
remembered utility may be a sort of weighted average in which the weights of moment utilities are not 
equal and more importance tend to be attributed to the end of period experiences.
8 The role of most 
recent  experiences  in  self  declared  life  satisfaction  is  confirmed  by  lab  experiments.  After  having 
invited subjects in a lab, Schwarz (1987) asked them to copy a paper before filling in a questionnaire. 
In doing the preliminary task, a randomly chosen half of the sample found a dime deliberately put on 
the copy machine. Life satisfaction of subjects who found the coin resulted positively affected by this 
experience. Moreover, Schwarz and Clore (1983) show that subjects’ answers may also be influenced 
by the current weather.
9 These considerations warn us about the reliability of survey questions when 
measuring people’s happiness or life satisfaction, since such questions tend to be strongly affected by 
contingent situations. 
In the present paper we show supporting evidence that recent experiences may significantly 
affect  declarations  on  overall  happiness.  On  the  basis  of  this  literature,  we  interpret  the  effect  on 
                                                 
7 Very similar happiness questions are, for example, the ones used in the World Values Surveys (WVS): "Taking all things 
together, would you say you are very happy, rather happy, not very happy, not at all happy?" and in the General Social 
Survey (GSS): “Taken all together, how would you say things are these days – would you say that you are very happy, 
pretty happy, or not too happy”. 
8 Empirical findings often show that more weight is also associated to the experience peaks. For example, with regard to a 
bad experience, the intensity of the worst moment greatly affects the remembered utility of the experience (Kahneman, 
Fredrickson, Schreiber and Redelmeier 1993).  
9 They also show that weather does not influence reported life satisfaction if subjects are first asked expressly about it.     6 
trustors’ happiness declarations in our experiment as the effect of a very recent (with respect to the 
filling in of the questionnaires) pleasure experience which affected trustors’ moment utility. 
 
3. Experimental design and procedure  
 
Our  investment  game  experiment  involved  368  students  from  three  different  Italian 
Universities. The initial endowment of subjects was 10 tokens (1 token=0.50 euros). We adopted a 
between-subjects design since each subject participated only to one treatment. We ran 8 sessions (each 
with 16 subjects) at the University of Trento, 4 sessions (each with 32 subjects) at the Milano-Bicocca 
University  and  4  sessions  (2  with  32  subjects,  1  with  26  subjects  and 1  with  22  subjects)  at  the 
University of Forlì. Each session lasted on average 45 minutes. Participants earned on average   10.20 
(including a show-up fee of   3). At the University of Milano-Bicocca and at the University of Forlì 
subjects were recruited by email.
10 At the University of Trento they were recruited by posting ads at 
various departments.
11 The subjects who participated in the experiments were all students enrolled in 
different programs of study, even though most of them were students of Economics. In all sessions, 
subjects played the game and filled in the survey by using a computer. The experiment was completely 
anonymous. Two experimenters were in the room during the sessions and coordinated all of them. 
In each session, before the subjects arrived in the room, the two experimenters associated at 
random the role of trustor or trustee to each computer and linked each computer with another one in the 
room.  When  subjects  arrived  in  the  room,  they  picked  a  slip  of  paper  with  an  alphanumerical 
identification code from a box and chose one of the computers at random. By choosing a computer, 
players automatically and at random decided their role (trustor or trustee) and were assigned to their 
counterpart. The experimenters gave subjects written instructions (instructions are available from the 
author upon request) which were read aloud by one of the experimenters. The subjects signed in by 
entering their alphanumerical identification code on their computers. Thus they discovered their role 
and played the game. After each trustor made her choice by deciding how many tokens to send to the 
trustee, a message with the tripled number of tokens sent by the trustor appeared on the monitor of the 
                                                 
10 All  students included in the  mailing list of the Experimental Economics  Laboratory  (EELAB) of the University  of 
Milano-Bicocca and in the mailing list of the Laboratory of Experimental Economics (LES) of the University of Forlì could 
potentially take part to the experiments. Two weeks before the experiment they received an email in which the staff invited 
them to visit the Laboratory’s website for information about the experiment and subscriptions.  
11 Ads were posted seven days before the experiment. Subscriptions by students interested in participating to the experiment 
have been collected by the staff of the Computable and Experimental Economics Laboratory (CEEL) of the University of 
Trento.    7 
trustee. Successively, the trustee made her choice and the game finished. Finally, the payoff of the 
players appeared on their monitors. Subjects were paid just after the end of the experiment. 
A randomly chosen part of our sample students filled in the questionnaire after having played 
(218 out of 368) and the other part before playing and knowing the rules of the game (for further details 
about the timing of the experiment see Appendix 1). 
Our experiment was also characterized by a specific treatment (the “meeting treatment”) aimed 
at studying the effect of the reduction of social distance in an investment game (evidence on this effect 
and more detail on this treatment are in Becchetti et al. 2007). In fact, 186 out of our 368 subjects had 
the possibility to choose whether to opt for meeting their counterpart after the end of the game (the 
other 182 players played a standard investment game). Individuals who opted for the meeting, met their 
counterparts after the game, but only if their counterparts had decided to meet them as well. Decisions 
about the willingness to meet the other player were collected by asking subjects to fill a form with the 
following question: “Do you want to meet, at the end of the experiment, the person you are paired 
with?”. They were informed of the fact that the meeting would take place only if both players replied 
with a “Yes”. When subjects made their choices about the meeting they knew the rules of the game, but 
they did not know which role they were going to play and about the meeting choice of the counterpart. 
Subjects were informed on their opponents’ choice about the meeting only at the end of the game and 
after the payment. If both players opted for the meeting they actually met. 
In case of the meeting treatment, players who filled in questionnaires before the game did not 
know  anything  about  the  meeting  option  when  they  answered  the  questionnaires’  questions.  The 
questionnaires that were filled in after the game were answered after the decision about the meeting, 
but before knowing the meeting decision of the counterpart and before meeting the counterpart.
12 As 
we will show in the empirical analysis, the existence of the meeting option does not affect in any way 











                                                 
12 For further details about the timing of the experiment see Appendix 1.    8 
4. Hypotheses and Results 
 
Hypotheses and Descriptive Findings 
 
Ex post (with respect to the game) happiness declarations of both trustors and trustees in the 
investment game may be affected by:  
   their own final payoffs (self-interest); 
   the final payoff of the counterpart (altruism);  
   the comparison between their own and the counterpart’s final payoff (inequity aversion). 
Ex post trustors’ happiness declarations may also be affected by:  
   the amount sent to the trustee (warm glow, social-welfare preferences
13); 
   the amount sent back by the trustee (trustee’s reciprocity). 
Ex post trustees’ happiness declarations may be also affected by:  
   the amount received from the trustor (trustor’s trust),  
   the amount returned to the trustor (warm glow). 
Tables 1 and 2 display our experimental evidence on trustors and trustees with respect to the previous 
hypotheses. 
 
Table 1 Determinants of ex post happiness declarations: descriptive evidence on trustors 
Hypotheses on the determinants of ex post trustors’ 
happiness 
Correlation between the ex post trustor’s happiness 
declaration and: 
self-interest  the trustor’s final payoff: -0.036 
 
altruism  the counterpart’s final payoff: 0.169* 
 
inequity aversion  the absolute value of the difference between the 
trustors’ payoff and the counterpart’s payoff: 0.002 
 
warm glow, social-welfare preferences   the amount sent to the trustee: 0.198** 
 
trustee’s reciprocity  the amount paid back by the trustee on the total 
amount received: 0.020 





                                                 
13 Notice that, given the game structure, the amount sent by the trustor is perfectly correlated with the social value generated 
in the game, i.e. the total payoff won by the two players.    9 
Table 2 Determinants of ex post happiness declarations: descriptive evidence on trustees 
Hypotheses on the determinants of ex post trustees’ 
happiness 
Correlation between the ex post trustee’s happiness 
declaration and: 
self-interest  the trustee’s final payoff: 0.027 
 
altruism  the counterpart’s final payoff: -0.021 
 
inequity aversion  the absolute value of the difference between trustee’s  
payoff and the counterpart’s payoff: 0.016 
 
trustor’s trust  the amount received from the trustor: 0.021 
 
warm glow  the amount returned to the trustor: -0.004 
(the amount paid back on the total 
amount received: 0.049) 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
 
Our results show that there is no statistically significant correlation between either trustees’ 
happiness declarations and payoffs obtained by trustors or between trustees’ decisions or payoffs and 
their happiness. By contrast, trustors’ ex post happiness declarations are correlated with:  
a)  the payoff obtained by trustees;  
b)  the amount sent by trustors (and, consequently, the total payoff generated in the game which 
strictly depends on the trustor’s contribution – correlation is 1).  
Since the amount won by trustees and the amount sent by trustors are positively correlated (0.852, 
significant at 1%), it is not possible, by just considering the data on trustors, to disentangle between the 
effect of warm glow, altruism and social-welfare preferences on happiness. However, by looking at the 
evidence on trustees, the effect on trustors’ happiness of altruism and warm glow may be reasonably 
excluded. In fact, if these motivations are capable of affecting happiness declarations, they should have 
also  affected  trustees’  answers.  On  the  contrary,  the  explanation  related  to  the  social-welfare 
preferences only applied to trustors. In fact, trustees can not act in order to increase the total payoff of 
the game.  
Moreover, by looking at our experimental data, we may exclude that the correlation between the 
amount  sent  and  the  happiness  declaration  is  due  to  indirect  effects  of  self-interest  and  inequity 
aversion. Since the monetary payoff obtained by trustors is negatively correlated with the amount sent 
(-0.351, significant at 1%, with regard to the trustors who filled in the survey after the game), we can 
suppose that subjects who feel happy by contributing in the game do not obtain their happiness from 
reasons related to self-interest. Not even the utility theory of inequality aversion developed by Fehr and   10 
Schmidt  (1999)  seems  to  be  helpful  to  explain  the  correlation  between  happiness  declaration  and 
amount sent by trustors. The two-agent version of the model proposed by Fehr and Schmidt is a utility 
function  of  the  form:  } { } { 0, max 0, max ) ( j i i i j i i i x x x x x x U         =     ,  i j  i i       1 0 <   i   . 
According to our results, xi decreases when the amount sent increases, and the difference between xi 
and xj increases with the amount sent by trustors (the correlation is equal to 0.829, significant at 1%, 
with regard to the trustors who filled in the survey after the game). For these reasons, on the basis of 
the payoffs won by players in our investment game, the utility got by inequity-averse trustors, and, 
consequently, their happiness declaration, should be lower when the amount sent increases.  
In what follows, the robustness of the positive correlation between the amount sent by trustors 
and their ex post happiness declarations will be analyzed. This result will be interpreted as the effect on 
happiness due to the implementation of an act aimed at increasing the total payoff of the game.  
 
The Issue of Causality 
The average trustor contribution is 4.48 tokens (min 0; max 10; std.dev. 3.13).  It does not 
significantly change (two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test= 1.236 Prob > |z| = 0.216) 
if we consider the two subsamples of trustors who filled in the survey before (mean 4.85; min 0; max 
10; std.dev. 3.27) and after (mean 4.22; min 0; max 10; std.dev. 3.01) the game. This seems to indicate 
that there is no survey effect on the trustor’s decision, that is, the amount sent by the trustor does not 
appear to be affected by questions included in the questionnaire.  
If  we  consider  the  total  sample,  a  significant  (at  1%)  and  positive  correlation  between  the 
amount sent by trustors and their happiness declarations (0.198) comes out. However, this correlation 
disappears if we consider the sub sample of trustors who filled in the survey before the game (0.079), 
while it remains significant at 1% if we consider the sub sample of trustors who filled in the survey 
after the game (0.310). Even if we have not investigated the robustness of this relation yet, what is 
more interesting here is that the correlation between the level of happiness declared by trustors and 
their contribution in the investment game seems to be the expression of a specific causality direction 
that goes from the latter to the former. Trustors who contribute more in the game declare, after having 
played, a higher level of happiness.  
 
 
   11 
Econometric Findings 
In  order  to  examine  the  effect  of  the  amount  sent  (variable  named  Amount_sent)  on  the 
happiness  declaration  (Happiness)  we  performed  ordered  logit  estimates
14  in  which  the  level  of 
happiness is associated with the amount sent by trustors and with various controls.
15 Controls include:  
   variables determined in the game, i.e. the trustors’ payoff (Trustor_payoff), the trustees’ payoff 
(Trustee_payoff),  the  absolute  value  of  the  difference  between  trustors’  payoff  and  the 
counterparts’ payoff (Payoff_comparison), the amount sent back by the trustee (Payback), the 
amount paid back on the total amount received (Share_payback);
16 
   socioeconomic determinants, i.e. age (Age and Age_squared), gender (Male - gender dummy 
taking the value of one if the subject is a male), income (Income)
17, health (Health - dummy 
variable which takes the value of 1 if subject declares to have never had health problems)
18, 
marriage (Marriage - dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the subject is married) and 
ethnicity (Ethnicity - dummy variable which takes the value of 1 in case of Italian subjects);
19 
   the  location  dummies  (Trento  and  Forli)  which  consider  the  different  places  where  the 
experiments have been conducted;  
   a dummy  which considers if subjects participated in the treatment with the meeting option 
(Meeting_option) and a dummy (Meeting_yes) which distinguishes between players who opted 
for the meeting and players who do not (this last variable was used only in the estimations 
referred to the sub-sample of people who took part in the treatment with the meeting option). 
Table  3  shows  the  regressions  on  players  who  filled  in  the  questionnaires  after  the  game. 
Equation  1  presents  the  estimation  which  includes  the  amount  sent  by  the  trustors,  all  the 
socioeconomic variables used as controls, the location dummies and the meeting option dummy. It 
                                                 
14 Results do not significantly change by using OLS estimations.  
15 The full list of variables used and descriptive statistics are presented in Appendix 2. 
16 The total amount won by the two players has not been considered because it is perfectly correlated with the amount sent. 
17 Variable which varies between 1 and 7 according to the answer to the following question: Please consider the following 
income  classes.  Could  you  indicate  the  class  of  your  family  considering  wages,  pensions  and  all  the  other  income 
concerning your family’s members? Choose the class considering the net income (after taxation). 
1)  0-9.999;  2)  10.000-19.999;  3)  20.000-29.999;  4) 30.000-39.999;  5) 40.000-49.999; 6)  50.000-59.999; 7)  more  than 
60.000  
18 The dummy variable stems from the following question: “Have you ever had health problems? (It is possible to mark 
more than one answer): a) Less than 6 months ago; b) Between 6 months ago and 2 years ago; c) Between 2 and 4 years 
ago; d) More than 4 years ago; e) Never.” 
19 Many socioeconomic variables have been considered as determinants of happiness (Dolana, Peasgooda, White 2007). In 
this  paper  we  focus  on  the  usual  socioeconomic  determinants  (Graham,  Eggers,  Sukhtankar  2004)  a  part  from  the 
employment situation and education which have not been included in our regressions since our subjects are university 
students.   12 
shows a positive and significant effect of the amount sent on trustors’ happiness declarations. In this 
case, the marginal effects calculated at the mean of the Amount_sent variable show that the greater 
effect of the amount sent is on the probability of an happiness declaration equal to 9 (marginal effect is 
0.039) while the marginal effect associated with an happiness declaration equal to 10 is 0.008.  
 
INSERT TABLE 3 
 
Equations  2-7  also  consider  the  single  variables  determined  in  the  game.  The  effect  of  the 
amount sent by trustors is robust to the inclusion of all these controls with the exception of the trustees’ 
payoff. Multicollinearity (correlation between Amount_sent and Trustee_payoff is 0.900) prevents us 
from evaluating the relative contribution of one variable vis à vis that of the other. However, if trustors 
happiness declarations were affected by the trustees’ payoffs, we should symmetrically observe an 
effect  of  trustors’  payoffs  on  trustees’  happiness  declarations.  Since  the  descriptive  analysis 
demonstrates that it is not the case, we interpret the effect of trustees’ payoffs on trustors’ happiness as 
a spurious one, due to the high correlation with the amount sent.  
Table 4 displays evidence on our robustness check. First, we decided to control our result by 
considering the subsamples of subjects who: 1) played in the treatment without the meeting option; 2) 
played in the treatment with the meeting option (in this second case, the dummy variable Meeting_yes 
which  takes  into  account  the  decision  of  subjects  on  to  meet  or  not  to  meet  their  counterpart  is 
included). Second, given the high number of missing observations related to the income variable, we 
performed all the regressions reported in table 3 also without it. Table 4 only reports the coefficients of 
Amount_sent in these different checks. Complete estimates’ results are available from the authors upon 
request.  
 
INSERT TABLE 4 
 
In the estimations performed on the subsample of subjects who played in the treatment without 
the meeting option, the amount sent always affects the happiness declaration. In one case, when the 
amount returned by trustees is included in the regressions, the statistically significance is at 10%. With 
respect to the subsample of subjects who played in the treatment with the meeting option the coefficient 
of Amount_sent is always statistically significant (at 5%), except when the payoff won by trustees is 
included in the regression (notice that all the estimations which include both the amount sent and the   13 
payoff obtained by trustees are characterized by multicollinarity).
20 Finally, when we exclude from 
regressions the variable Income, we find that also when we consider 106 observations, the effect of 
Amount_sent on Happiness is confirmed.  
Tables 5 and 6 replicate the same estimations presented in tables 3 and 4 with respect to the 
subjects who played after having filled in the survey. In the subsample of subjects who played with the 
meeting options we performed OLS regressions since convergence is not achieved in ordered logit 
estimations  because  of  the  small  number  of  observations.  Results  from  the  econometric  analysis 
confirm descriptive findings. The relationship between the amount sent and the happiness declaration 
holds only for subjects who answered the happiness question after having played the game. 
 
INSERT TABLES 5 AND 6 
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
The  present  paper  draws  on  data  collected  in  an  investment  game  to  investigate  whether 
circumstances and/or outcomes of the game affect individuals’ self-declared happiness and verifies the 
consistency of observed findings with various patterns of preferences such as self-interest, inequity 
aversion, altruism, warm glow, social-welfare preferences, trust or reciprocity. Happiness has been 
measured through questionnaires filled in alternatively after the experiment or before explaining the 
rules of the game to the players.  
The descriptive analysis does not reveal any effect of the game on happiness declarations of 
trustees. By contrast, the amount sent by trustors and, consequently, the total payoff generated in the 
game, positively affects their ex post happiness declarations. Since no relationship exists between the 
happiness declarations and the amount sent with respect to the trustors who filled in the questionnaires 
before the game, we may consider that there is a specific causality direction that goes from the amount 
sent to happiness.  
The correlation between the amount sent by trustors and their ex post happiness may not be 
explained by considering either self-interest (the amount sent is negatively correlated with trustors’ 
payoffs) or inequity aversion (the payoff of trustors’ decreases and the difference between trustors’ and 
trustees’ payoff increases with the amount sent). Moreover, by comparing evidence on trustors and 
trustees, we may rule out explanation related to warm glow and altruism.  
                                                 
20 In this subsample, correlation between Amount_sent and Trustee_payoff is 0.926.   14 
To interpret our result we observe that, given the structure of the investment game, trustors have 
a value creating power (the amount sent by trustors is tripled by the experiment and it is the only way 
to increase the total game’s payoff) while trustees only redistributive. Because of that, the effect of the 
amount sent on trustors’ happiness may be interpreted in terms of social-welfare preferences. It is the 
act of sending and consequently the act of enlarging the total game payoff which affects trustors’ 
happiness. This result highlights a new motivation to act which may explain agents’ decisions in the 
investment game. 
The econometric analysis shows that the association between the amount sent and happiness is 
robust to the consideration of different subsamples and to the inclusion in the estimations of several 
control variables such as socioeconomic variables usually considered as determinants of happiness and 
variables related to the game. 
Our findings disclose a previously unexplored aspect of investment games and stimulate further 
research  to  verify  whether  they  can  be  successfully  replicated.  Ad  hoc  modified  investment  game 
experiment designs creating differences in the trustor’s generating (social welfare enhancing) power 
may reinforce or confute the relevance of a seldom considered motivation of human action.    15 
Table 3 The Determinants of Self Declared Happiness  





















  Dependent Variable: Happiness 
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(1.106) 

























































































































2   0.115  0.117  0.117  0.116  0.117  0.107 
Prob >  
2  0.010  0.014  0.014  0.015  0.014  0.044 
Number of obs.  64  64  64  64  64  60 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; standard errors in brackets.   16 
Table 4 The Effect of the Amount Sent on Happiness Declaration – Robustness Check 
(Sample of Subjects who Filled in the Survey after the Game) 
 
  Estimations on the sub 
sample of players who 
played without the 
meeting option 
(Number of Obs. 30) 
Estimations on the sub 
sample of players who 
played with the meeting 
option 
(Number of Obs. 34) 
Estimations on the whole 
sample without the 
variable Income 
 
(Number of Obs. 106) 
  Coefficient of Amount_sent  






























Equation 6  0.426 
(0.194)** 





(Number of obs 26) 
Ordered logit estimations. Dependent Variable: Happiness. Equations 1-6 related to the sub sample of players who played 
without the meeting option include the same variables of the corresponding equations 1-6 reported in Table 1. Equations 
related to the sub sample of players who played in the treatment with the meeting option include all the variables of the 
corresponding equations 1-6 reported in Table 1 and the variable Meeting_yes. Equations 1-6 related to the whole sample of 
players include the same variables of the corresponding equations 1-6 reported in Table 1 except the variable Income. * 
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Table 5 The Determinants of Self Declared Happiness  





















  Dependent Variable: Happiness 
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  1.125 
(1.012) 

























































































































2   0.082  0.091  0.091  0.094  0.091  0.095 
Prob >  
2  0.208  0.187  0.187  0.162  0.187  0.231 
Number of obs.  54  54  54  54  54  48 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; standard errors in brackets.   18 
Table 6 The Effect of the Amount Sent on Happiness Declaration – Robustness Check 
(Sample of Subjects who Filled in the Survey before the Game) 
 
  Estimations on the sub 
sample of players who 
played without the 
meeting option 
 (Number of Obs.21)  
OLS estimations 
Estimations on the sub 
sample of players who 
played with the meeting 
option 
 (Number of Obs.33) 
Ordered logit estimations 
Estimations on the whole 
sample without the 
variable Income 
 
(Number of Obs. 68) 
Ordered logit estimations 
   
Coefficient of Amount_sent 






























Equation 6  0.325 
(0.374) 
(Number of Obs.16) 
-0.325 
(0.182)* 
(Number of Obs.32) 
-0.050 
(0.111) 
(Number of Obs.59) 
Dependent Variable: Happiness. Equations 1-6 related to the sub sample of players who played without the meeting option 
include the same variables of the corresponding equations 1-6 reported in Table 1. Equations related to the sub sample of 
players who played in the treatment with the meeting option include all the variables of the corresponding equations 1-6 
reported in Table 1 and the variable Meeting_yes. Equations 1-6 related to the whole sample of players include the same 
variables of the corresponding equations 1-6 reported in Table 1 except the variable Income. * Significant at 10%; ** 
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Appendix 1. Timing of the experiment  
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Appendix 2. Descriptive statistics (sample of subjects who filled in the survey after the game) 
Variable  Obs.  Mean  Std. Deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
Amount_sent  109  4.220  3.013  0  10 
Happiness   107  7.579  1.542  1  10 
Trustor_payoff  109  8.505  3.800  0  26 
Trustee_payoff  109  19.936  8.175  10  40 
Payoff_comparison  109  11.761  10.886  0  40 
Payback  109  2.725  3.934  0  24 
Share_payback  97  0.234  0.230  0  1 
Age  109  22.202  2.981  18  32 
Age_squared  109  501.725  143.884  324  1024 
Male  107  0.449  0.500  0  1 
Income   65  3.846  1.593  1  7 
Health  109  0.514  0.502  0  1 
Marriage  109  0.550  0.229  0  1 
Ethnicity  108  0.898  0.304  0  1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 